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INVESTOR-STATE MEDIATION AND THE RISE OF TRANSPARENCY
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: OPPORTUNITY OR
THREAT?

SHAHLA F. ALt & ODYSSEAS G. REPousis
I.

INTRODUCTION

Today, more than ever, the role of investor-state mediation cannot be
appraised without regard to the mounting concerns against investor-state
arbitration. Investment treaties typically protect nationals of one Contracting Party
(natural persons or corporations) when realizing investments in the other
Contracting Party State.' The most common form of such treaties is the bilateral
investment treaty (BIT). As of today, more than 2,800 BITs have been concluded,
2,100 of which are in force.2 To these treaties one may add regional free trade
agreements that include investment chapters or regional investment treaties. One of
the many examples is Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) that covers investments. All of these treaties provide for substantive
rights and protections such as the prohibition against uncompensated expropriation
and various non-discriminatory standards.4 However, investment treaties have
Dr. Ali is Associate Professor and Deputy Head, Department of Law & Deputy Director, Program in
Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong and Member of the IBA
Investor State Mediation Rules Drafting Committee. Special thanks the Government of Hong Kong's
University Grants Committee for its kind support through its GRF Grant (HKU 17603215). Mr.
Repousis is Ph.D. candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong.
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1. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 158-60, 169-71 (2009);
RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 235-37
(2008); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND
INTERPRETATION 2-4 (2010); CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN, DON WALLACE, JR., NOAH D. RUBINS
BoRzu SABAHI, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 51-52 (2008).

2. U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. (UNCTAD),

Inv. Pol'y Hub: Int'l Inv. Agreements,

http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA.

3. See North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1131, 1 2, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; MEG N. KINNEAR, ANDREA K. BJORKLUND & JOHN F. G.
HANNAFORD, INVESTMENT DISPUTES UNDERNAFTA: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO NAFTA CHAPTER 11
(2006); Andrea K. Bjorklund, NAFTA, in COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT

TREATIES 506 (Chester Brown ed., 2013).
4. See ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS (2009);
JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES (2nd ed. 2015); DOLZER & SCHREUER,
supra note 1, at 119; DUGAN ET AL., supra note 1; RUDOLPH DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS,
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995); JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR
FOREIGN CAPITAL (2013); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Peter
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attained their present recognition due to their dispute settlement provisions and
particularly the investor-state arbitration clause almost mechanically inserted in the
majority of such treaties. This arbitration clause enables investors to directly sue
the host state for breaches of the investment treaty in an international arbitral
tribunal typically comprised of three members.s Investor-state arbitrations are
either ad hoc or institutional, 6 with the most well regarded institutional body being
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
established by the Washington 1965 Convention. 7
Over the past three decades, investor-state arbitration proliferated with ICSID
registering fifty cases per year and administering more than two hundred at any
given time.8 The most frequent respondent states are Argentina (more than fifty
cases), Venezuela, Czech Republic, Egypt, Canada, Mexico, Ecuador, India,
Ukraine, Poland, and the United States. 9 The increasing use of investor-state
arbitration has also been met with opposition and a widespread consensus for the
need of reform.' 0 Over the past few years, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela
withdrew from the ICSID Convention and terminated a considerable number of
BITs.' More recently, South Africa and Indonesia have also filed notices to
Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008);

CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN QC,
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL
LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES (2007); NOAH RUBINS & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (2005);
VANDEVELDE, supra note 1.
5. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other

States, § 2, art. 37, 1 37(2)(b), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force on Oct. 14, 1966)
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
6. Compare Corona Materials, LLC. v. Dom. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/14/3, Award on
the Respondent's Expedited Preliminary Objection, (May 31, 2016), with Occidental Petroleum Corp.
and Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 1, Decision
on Annulment, (Nov. 2, 2015).
7. ICSID Convention, supranote 5, § 1, art. 1; see ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID
(2012); CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, JURISDICTION OF SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

433-35 (2009).
8. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 2015 Annual

Report 21 (Sept. 4, 2015).
9. U. N. Conf. on Trade & Developments, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of
Developments in 2014, 2 HA Issues Note at 2-3, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2015/2 (May 2015),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb20l5d2_en.pdf.
10. See Christoph Schreuer, Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and Consent to Arbitration,
&

in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 353-68 (Michael
Waibel et al. eds., 2010); see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 243; JEAN E. KALICKI
ANNA JOUBIN-BRET (EDS.), RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM:
JOURNEYS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2015).

11. See briefly U. N. Conference on Trade & Development, Denunciation of the ICSID
Convention

and

BITs:

Impact

on

Investor-State

Claims,

2

IIA

Issues

Note

at

1,

UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/1A/2010/2 (Dec. 2010) http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf; see
Ricardo Dalmaso Marques, Notes on the Persistent Latin American Countries' Attitude Towards
Investment Arbitration and ICSID, WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (July 24, 2014),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/07/24/some-notes-on-the-latin-american-countries-attitude-

towards-investment-arbitration-and-icsid.
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terminate BITs.12

'

The opposition towards investor-state arbitration stems, in many regards,
from the characteristics of such contemporary dispute settlement procedures. In a
nutshell, a significant number of investment arbitration cases involve investment in
public service sectors and public utilities;1 3 investment claims arising out of
emergency economic measures or civil unrest; 14 and cases that revolve around
issues of public health, environmental regulation,' 5 and human rights, in general.' 6
Moreover, investor-state cases often involve allegations of state misconduct and
corruption,' 7 are costly dispute settlement procedures, and the payment of
compensation in connection with any arising arbitration awards is borne by the
taxpayers of the host state.' 8 All these factors are to the interest of the local
population as the objectives of foreign investors, governments, and local
populations are oftentimes conflicting.' 9 Investor-state arbitration has also been
criticized for enabling the so-called "regulatory chill",2 0 which is a hesitancy to
implement a higher degree of regulation in fear of investment arbitration claims. 2
12. Jonathan Lang, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A shield or a sword?, BOWAN GILFILLAN:
CORPORATE NEWSFLASH, http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/South-AfricanGovemment-Canceling-Bilateral-Investment-Treaties.pdf.
13. See Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22,
Procedural Order No 3, 1 60 (Sept. 29, 2006); Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID
Case No. ARB/12/12 (Oct. 2016); Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/94/2, Award, § G, Art. 4 (Apr. 29, 1999), 5 ISCID Rep. 70 (2002).
14. See, e.g., PottovA banka, a.s. v. Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, Award, ¶ 46
(Apr. 9, 2015); Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (formerly named Giovanna a
Beccara v. the Argentine Republic).
15. See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Final Award of the Tribunal on

Jurisdiction

&

Merits,

Part

III,

1

56

(NAFTA

Trib.

http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes/usa/Methanex/MethanexFinalAward.pdf;

Aug.

3,

2005),

Vattenfall AB, ICSID

Case No. ARB/12/12; Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12,
Award
on
Jurisdiction
&
Admissibility,
¶
102,
111,
390-92,
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1711.
16. See, e.g., Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award,
§ 2(B).
17. See, e.g., Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, Chap. IV, 1
154.; World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, § II, 1 74
(Oct. 4, 2006).; see generally ALOYSIuS P. LLAMZON, CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION (2014).

18. See Yukos UniversalLtd. (Isle ofMan) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, Final
Award, 1635, 1887 (July 18, 2014) (award of USD 60,000,000).
19. See Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What's in a Meme? The Truth about InvestorState Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J.

TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 719-20 (2014); Laurence Boisson de Chazoumes, Making the ProceedingsPublic
and Allowing Third Party Interventions: Are the New Generation Bilateral Investment Treaties (U.S.,
Canada) Bifurcating Investment Arbitration from International Commercial Arbitration?, 6 J. WORLD

INV. & TRADE 105, 105-08 (2005); Nigel Blackaby & Caroline Richard, Amicus Curiae: A Panacea for
Legitimacy in Investment Arbitration?, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:

PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 253, 253-55 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).
20. Scott Miller, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES
(Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/investor-state-dispute-settlement.
21. Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political
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As later discussed in this article, another source of concern for investor-state
arbitration is the lack of transparency in such transnational proceedings.2 2 Finally,
another concern that is frequently raised is the use of investor-state arbitration to
circumvent national courts and the perceived bias of arbitrators, that act both as
counsel and as arbitrator in related proceedings.2 3
The above concerns have influenced the drafting of contemporary investment
treaties and have also led to initiatives seeking to reform some of the perceived
deficiencies of international investment law. The most notable of such initiatives is
the rise of transparency discussed in Part IV of this article. 24 Suffice however to
say, that it should not be hard to see that greater transparency in investor-state
arbitration is aimed at alleviating some of the concerns referred to above. Investorstate mediation is nevertheless a pre-arbitration dispute resolution method that, if
successful, eliminates the need to pursue investor-state arbitration. However, as we
will see, mediation in general and investor-state mediation in particular, is highly
confidential. Would this then mean that investor-state mediation may be used as a
medium to circumvent the increasing standards of transparency and other public
concerns that are sought to be addressed when it comes to investor-state
arbitration? In other words, if the concerns raised with regard to investor-state
arbitration have merit, why shouldn't they be applicable with respect to any
investor-state dispute settlement proceeding? In addition to these questions, one
should also take into account that the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is considering a multilateral convention on the
enforcement of mediated settlements.2 5 If this treaty were to be concluded, would it
mean that investor-state mediation would not only be a convenient method to avoid

&

Science, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606, 607 (Chester Brown
Kate Miles eds., 2011).
22. See N. Jansen Calamita, Dispute Settlement Transparency in Europe's Evolving Investment
Treaty Policy: Adopting the UNCITRAL TransparencyRules Approach, 15 J. WORLD INVEST. & TRADE

645, 650-53 (2014).
23. See Michael Waibel et al., The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and
Reality, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY xxxvii,

xxxvii-li (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See generally Laila El Shentenawi, A New York Convention for Mediation May be Coming
Soon, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-416b9435-39bb4fa7-a3b0-1039f0007e7f, UNCITRAL Rep., Forty-Seventh Session, UN Doc A/69/17, 1 124 (July 718, 2014) stating that:
Support was expressed for possible work in that area on many of the bases expressed above.
Doubts were also expressed as to the feasibility of the project and questions were raised in
relation to that possible topic of work, including: (a) whether the new regime of enforcement
envisaged would be optional in nature; (b) whether the New York Convention was the
appropriate model for work in relation to mediated settlement agreements; (c) whether
formalizing enforcement of settlement agreements would in fact diminish the value of
mediation as resulting in contractual agreements; (d) whether complex contracts arising out
of mediation were suitable for enforcement under such a proposed treaty; (e) whether other
means of converting mediated settlement agreements into binding awards obviated the need
for such a treaty; and (f) what the legal implications for a regime akin to the New York
Convention in the field of mediation might be.
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the high levels of transparency now paradigmatic to investor-state arbitration, but
would also enjoy high levels of international enforceability?
For now, these arguably legitimate concerns may be kept as a working
hypothesis, or an issue to be determined after the apposition of three tenets. The
first is the role of negotiation and pre-arbitration consultations in international
investment law discussed in Part II of this article. With respect to this tenet, this
article shows that investment treaties usually provide for negotiation and prearbitration consultation periods as a means to promote the amicable resolution of
disputes between investors and host states. Given however that investor-state
mediation is a distinct dispute resolution method, an examination of negotiation
and pre-arbitration consultation periods is required in order to more fully detail the
role and potential use of investor-state mediation. The second tenet is dealt with in
Part II that focuses on the development and evolution of investor-state mediation
as a distinct pre-arbitration dispute resolution procedure. 26 Specific weight is given
to two recent developments, the adoption by the International Bar Association
(IBA) of a distinct set of rules for investor-state mediation that took place in
2012,27 and the appearance of distinct investor-state mediation provisions in recent
investment treaties.28 Finally, the third tenet is the rise of transparency in investorstate arbitration that is discussed in Part 111.29 In particular, this part lays out the
main characteristics of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency and of the
Mauritius Convention on Transparency in investor-state arbitration. 30 With these
three tenets in place, Part V analyzes the implications of transparency in
international investment law to the future role and importance of investor-state
mediation.
II. INVESTOR-STATE MEDIATION AND OTHER PRE-ARBITRATION OPTIONS
A.

Amicable Consultationsand Negotiation

Investment treaties typically include a series of pre-arbitration requirements
that can be broken down into amicable consultation periods, waiver and consent
provisions,3 1 and prior-litigation requirements.3 2 This section only focuses on the
26. See infra Section II.
27.

See International Bar Association, Rules for Investor-State Mediation, art. 1,

¶

1 (Oct. 4,

2012),
http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Dispute ResolutionSection/Mediation/StateMediation/Default.aspx.
28. Comprehensive Economic & Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., art. 8.2, Sept. 14, 2016, 10973
Council of European Union 16; Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion & Protection of Investments,

Belg.-U.A.E., art. 12, 111, Mar. 8, 2004, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub.
29.

See infra Section III.

30. Rep. of the Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, at Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/68/17 (Jan. 2014); G.A.
Res. 69/116, at 2/7 (Feb. 2015).
31.

See J.C. Thomas, Investor-State Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11, 37 CAN. YB. INT'L L.

99, 115-19 (1999); Jacob S. Lee, No "Double-Dipping"Allowed: An Analysis of Waste Management,
Inc. v. United Mexican States and the Article 1121 Waiver Requirementfor Arbitration under Chapter

11 ofNAFTA, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 2655, 2669 (2001).
32.

See, e.g., Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion & Protection of Investments, Arg.-Spain,

art. X, I 3(a), Oct. 3, 1991, 1699 U.N.T.S. 29403 (a claim may be submitted to investment arbitration if
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first pre-arbitration requirement, which is often referred to as "consultation and
negotiation." 33 A typical investment treaty provision of this kind usually reads as
follows:
The disputing parties should first attempt to settle a claim through
consultation or negotiation. 3
The verb "shall" is sometimes replaced by the verb "should." 3 5 However,
investment treaties are generally not particularly specific as to the form and
procedure that this effort to amicably settle investment disputes needs to take.
Some investment treaties nevertheless require the filing of a "written request" for
consultations or negotiations36 as well as set specific timeframes for the holding of
such amicable procedures. 37 Furthermore, the amicable settlement requirement
"after a period of eighteen (18) months has elapsed from the moment when the dispute was submitted to
the competent tribunal of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was made, the said
tribunal has not given its final decision, or where the final decision has been made but the parties are
still in dispute."); see also Agreement for the Promotion & Protection of Investments, Arg.-U.K.-N. Ir.
B.I.T., art. 8, 1 2(a), Dec. 11, 1990, 1765 U.N.T.S. 30682; Treaty on the Encouragement & Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, Arg.-Ger., art. 10, 1 3(a), Apr. 9, 1991, 1091 U.N.T.S. 32583.
33. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INV. TREATY, art. 23 (2012),
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit.;
Italian 2003
Model B.I.T., art. X, 1 1
(2003),
http://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties [hereinafter Italian Model BIT]. Such consultation and
negotiation may also include the use of non-binding third-party procedures. See e.g., Ass'n of Southeast
(2007),
1
1
31,
art.
Agreement,
Inv.
Comprehensive
Nations
Asia
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3095 [hereinafter ASEAN CIA].
34. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1118. See also Draft Agreement Between the Government of the
Republic of France and the Government of the Republic of [Country] on the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, art. 7 (2006), http://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties ("Any dispute
concerning the investments occurring between one Contracting Party and a national or company of the
other Contracting Party shall be settled amicably between the two parties concerned.") [hereinafter
France Model BIT]; see also Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the
Government of the Republic of [Country] for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 9, ¶ 1
(2003), http://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties [hereinafter India Model BIT]; Free Trade
Agreement, China-Peru, art. 139, 1 1 (Apr. 28, 2009) Agreement for the Strengthening of Economic
Partnership, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu/annex/bilu xdwben.pdf [hereinafter China-Peru FTA];
Agreement for the Strengthening of the Economic Partnership, Japan-Mex., art. 77 (Sept. 17, 2004)
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
of
Japan,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/mexico/agreement/agreement.pdf.
35. Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and [Country] Concerning the
Encouragement
and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments,
art. 10, 1 1
(2008),
http://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties [hereinafter German Model BIT]; Agreement Between the
Kingdom of Norway and [Country] for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 15, 1 2 (2007),
http://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties. See Energy Charter Treaty, art. 26, 1 1, Dec. 17, 1994, 280
U.N.T.S. 36116 (entered into force Apr. 16, 1998) (The ECT employs the verb "shall" along with the
"if possible" proviso. "Disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another Contracting
Party relating to an Investment of the latter in the Area of the former, which concern an alleged breach
of an obligation of the former under Part III shall, if possible, be settled amicably.") [hereinafter ECT].
36. See, e.g., ASEAN CIA, supranote 33, at art. 31, 11 (". . . consultations shall be initiated by a
written request for consultations delivered by the disputing investor to the disputing Member State.").
37. Compare Agreement Between Canada and [Country] for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, art. 25, 1 2 (2004), http://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties ("Consultations shall be
held within 30 days of the submission of the notice of intent to submit a claim to arbitration, unless the
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found in investment treaties is in principle supplemented by a specific cooling-off
period3 8 that usually ranges between three,3 9 six,40 and twelve months. 41
Failing to amicably settle a dispute within the given cooling-off period allows
for an investor to bring an investor-state arbitration claim. 4 2 However, investorstate tribunals have not been uniform in approaching pre-arbitration consultation
periods. For example, an issue of great divide has been the ability of an investor to
resort to arbitration if amicable consultations/negotiations failed or are futile but
the cooling-off period has not yet lapsed.43 In this respect, a possible way to
determine the nature of pre-arbitration consultation periods would be to examine
the language used by the contracting parties to an investment treaty. However, this
is not an easy task since treaty stipulations differ as well as rarely provide for any

.

disputing parties otherwise agree."), with ASEAN CIA, supra note 33, at art. 31, 1 2 (which however
refers to "30 days of receipt by the disputing Member State of the request for consultations . .
38.
39.

DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 249-50.
See, e.g., ECT, supra note 35, art. 26, 1 2; Agreement on Mutual Encouragement and

Protection of Investments, Bulg.-Cyprus, art. 4.1, June, 18, 1988, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub; Agreement
for the Promotion & Protection of Investments, Kyrg.-N. Ir. - U.K., art. 8, 1 1, Dec. 8, 1994, UNCTAD
Inv. Pol'y Hub; Agreement for the Promotion & Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Russ.-N. Ir.-

U.K., art. 8,

1

2, Apr. 6, 1989, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub; U.K.-Hung., art. 8,

1

1, Mar. 9, 1987;

Agreement on the Promotion & Protection of Investments, Aust.-FYROM, art. 12, ¶ 1, Mar. 28, 2001,
2195 U.N.T.S 191; Agreement on Encouragement & Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Neth.-Rom.,

art. 8, T 2, Oct. 27, 1983, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub.
40. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1120, 1 1; Agreement on the Promotion & Reciprocal Protection
of Investments, Lat.-Swed., art. 8, 1 2, Mar. 10, 1992, 1823 U.N.T.S. 31209; Agreement Regarding the
Promotion & Mutual Protection of Investments, Cyprus-Russ., art. 7, ¶ 2, Apr. I1, 1997, UNCTAD Inv.
Pol'y Hub; Agreement on the Promotion & Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Geor.-Grecce, art. 8,

1 2,

Nov. 9, 1994, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub; Agreement on the Promotion & Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Croat.-Slovn., art. 8, ¶ 2, Dec. 12, 1997, 2366 U.N.T.S. 42665; Agreement Concerning the
Reciprocal Protection & Promotion of Investments, Belg.-Hung., art. 9, 1 2, May, 14, 1986, UNCTAD
Inv. Pol'y Hub; Convention for the Protection & Promotion of Investments, Spain-Russ., art. 10,

1

1,

Oct. 26, 1990, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub; Treaty on the Promotion & Mutual Protection of Investments,
Germ.-Ukr., art. 11, $ 1, Feb. 15, 1993; Free Trade Agreement, China-Pak., art. 54, ¶ 2, Nov. 24, 2006,
China FTA Network, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enpakistan.shtml; China-Peru FTA, supra note 34,
art. 139, $ 2.
41. See, e.g., Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion & Protection of Investments, Pol.-Turk.,

&

art. 8, ¶ 1, Aug. 21, 1991, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub; Agreement on the Reciprocal Encouragement
Protection of Investments, China-Pak., art. 10, Feb. 12, 1989, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub.
42. See, e.g., German Model BIT, supra note 35, at art. 10,

1

2 ("If the dispute cannot be settled

within six months of the date on which it was raised by one of the parties to the dispute, it shall, at the
request of the investor of the other Contracting State, be submitted to arbitration."); France Model BIT,
supra note 34, art. 7 ("If this dispute has not been settled within a period of six months from the date on

which it occurred by one or other of the parties to the dispute, it shall be submitted at the request of
either party to [arbitration] . . . ."); India Model BIT, supra note 34, art. 9, 12 ("Any such dispute which
has not been amicably settled within a period of six months may, if both Parties agree, be submitted [to
arbitration]"); Italian Model BIT, art. X,

1

3 ("In the event that such dispute cannot be settled as

provided for in paragraph I [amicable settlement] of this Article within six months from the date of the
written application for settlement, the investor in question may submit at his choice the dispute for

settlement to..."); NAFTA, Article 1120(1): ".

.

provided that six months have elapsed since the
.

events giving rise to a claim, a disputing investor may submit the claim to arbitration .

43. See infra p. 8-9.
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clarifications whatsoever. For example, the NAFTA provides that the "disputing
parties should first attempt to settle a claim through consultation or negotiation."44
Contrarily, the ECT employs the verb "shall" but also adds the proviso "if
possible." 45 The indeterminacy associated with the obligatory nature of prearbitration consultation periods is best reflected in the rulings of the tribunals in
47
Abaclat v. Argentina46 and Ambiente v. Argentina, both of which were
48
established under the Argentina-Italy BIT. In these cases, the tribunals were
49
divided in interpreting the amicable consultations clause. The first tribunal found
that "the consultation requirement" of the above BIT "is not to be considered of a
mandatory nature but as the expression of the good will of the Parties to try firstly
50
to settle any dispute in an amicable way" and it "only refers to the possibility of
such amicable settlement talks, whereby such term is to be reasonably understood
as referring not only to the technical possibility of settlement talks, but also to the
5
possibility, i.e. the [likelihood], of a positive result." ' Contrarily, the second
tribunal found that the Argentina-Italy BIT created a "multi-layered, sequential
52
dispute resolution system constituting mandatory jurisdictional requirements"
and the amicable consultations clause "clearly suggests that it creates a duty for the
53
Parties to enter into consultations."
The above findings clearly indicate the indeterminacy of pre-arbitration
54
consultation periods and question the obligatory nature of such consultations. At
the same time, the disputing parties to an investor-state arbitration can always
engage in negotiations for the settlement of their dispute. In fact, the latest ICSID
caseload statistics indicate that with regard to concluded cases, thirty six percent
Indeed, a prominent commentator has
were settled or otherwise discontinued.
56
noted that "[ilt is unclear whether settlement negotiations are mandatory" since
"nothing prevents [the parties] from engaging in settlement negotiations after the

44. NAFTA, supranote 3, art. 1118 (emphasis added).
45. See ECT, supranote 35, art. 26 11 ("Disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of
another Contracting Party relating to an Investment of the latter in the Area of the former, which

concern an alleged breach of an obligation of the former under Part III shall, if possible, be settled
amicably.").
46. Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (formerly named Giovanna a
Beccarav. the Argentine Republic), Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011).
47. Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9 (formerly named
GiordanoAlpi v. Argentine Republic), Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Feb. 8, 2013).
48. Agreement for the Promotion & Protection of Investments, Arg.-It., 1990, Investor-State
LawGuide, http://www.investorstatelawguide.com.

49. Id. at art. 8, 11.
50. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1564.
51. Id.
52. Ambiente, ICS1D Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1 570.
53. Id. 1 577.
54. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility;
Ambiente, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility.
55. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
CASELOAD - STATISTICS (IssUE 2016-1) 13 (2016).
56. Bjorklund, supranote 3, at 504.
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arbitration has commenced." 5 7 All these statements lead to the conclusion that
while investment treaties usually provide for amicable consultations or negotiation,
the mandatory, nature of such pre-arbitration procedures is not always clear. 8 At
the same time, settlement negotiations are always available to the disputing parties
even after the initiation of the arbitration claim. With these remarks in place, one
may wonder how investor-state mediation can provide an alternative avenue for
the pre-arbitration settlement of investment disputes.
B. Why then mediate? An Introduction
In order to understand the current need for investor-state mediation, two main
issues should be taken into consideration. First, due regard should be had to the
downsides of investor-state arbitration and contemporary international arbitration
proceedings. Second, investor-state mediation should be appraised in light of prearbitration consultations and negotiation.
With respect to the first issue, arbitration has theoretically been regarded as a
swift and cost-effective mechanism to resolve disputes among parties.60 However,
in the context of investor-state arbitration, empirical evidence appears to suggest
the contrary.61 The "sheer expense" of investor-state arbitrations are noted in
recent decisions.
The average costs of an investor-state arbitration
"skyrocketed" 63 from around $1 or 2 million USD before 20076 to around $8
million USD in 2012. 65 In some arbitrations, parties incurred costs of over $30
million USD." The OECD's finding in 2012 corresponds to the research result by
UNCTAD, quoting several examples of high legal costs within the range of $5
million USD to $10 million USD incurred for ISDS cases.6 7 The average length of
an investor-state arbitration was found to be around 3.6 years from the filing of the

57. Id.
58. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
Ambiente, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision
supra note 3, at 504.
59. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
Ambiente, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision
supra note 3, at 504.
60.

U.N.

CONF.

ON

TRADE

&

DEV.,

Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 564;
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 570; Bjorklund,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1 564;
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 570; Bjorklund,
INVESTOR-STATE

DIsPUTEs:

PREVENTION

AND

ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION, at 14, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/1 1, U.N. Sales No.
E.10.II.D11 (2010) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes].
61. Id. at 16-17.
62. David P. Riesenberg, Fee Shifting in Investor-State Arbitration: Doctrine and Policy
Justifying Application of the English Rule, 60 DUKE L. J. 977, 990 (2011).
63. UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes, supra, note 60, at 16.
64. David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper
for the Investment Policy Community, ORG. FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEv. [OECD] WORKING
PAPERS

ON

INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT

2012/03,

http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2012 3.pdf
65. Id. at 19.
66. Id.
67. UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes, supranote 60, at 17-18.

at

22

(2012),
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request for arbitration to the date of the final award. 68 The UNCTAD shared a
similar view, noting that it would take around 3 to 4 years for a case to be heard
and finally settled.
Regarding the reasons for the high costs of investor-state arbitration, scholars
have noted a number of contributing factors including: 1) limited arbitrator
availability; 70 2) nature and role of the parties' counsel and their approaches to
litigation ' (i.e. attributed to the use of expensive litigation techniques borrowed
from corporate litigation practices); 3) high billing rates of arbitration lawyers; 72 4)
substantial time spent on the selection of arbitrators; 73 5) proliferation of
procedural, jurisdictional and discovery issues; 74 6) expanded use of high-cost
party-appointed experts on a range of issues; 7 5 7) complexity of the legal and
factual issues in international investment law;7 6 8) high damages claims; 77 9)
79
number and length of written pleadings; and, 10) uncertain cost shifting rules.
Investor state mediation, on the other hand, has the potential of offering a
relatively efficient alternative. 80 In some cases, it may assist parties to explore
creative and innovative solutions that may lie outside strict legal remedies."' Such
remedies may be of particular relevance in polycentric, policy issues involving
82
complex issues of force majeur arising from unforeseen natural disasters. As
noted by Fuller, mediation can be of particular benefit in cases where adjudication
has reached its "limits" such as in "polycentric disputes" where there are no clear
issues subject to proofs and contentions. The case of Vattenfall v. Germany,
arising following the Fukushima nuclear disaster and subsequent decision of the
German government to phase out nuclear power production by 2022, arguably

68. Anthony Sinclair, ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does it Take? INT'L J. OF COM. & TREATY
ARB. (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.goldreserveinc.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/lCS[D-arbitration-

How-long-does-it-take.pdf.
69. UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes, supra note 60, at 18.
70. Id. at 16-17.
71. Id. at 20.
72. Id. at 17.
73. Id. at 14.
74. UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes, supra note 60, at 18.
75. Id. at 17.
76. Catherine M. Amirfar, Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investor-State Arbitration:An Informed
Approach to EmpiricalStudies About Law a Response to Professor Yackee 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L.

303, 310 n. 17 (2014).
77. UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes, supra note 60, at 17.
78. Amirfar, supra note 76.
79. UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes, supra note 60, at 17.
80. Shahla Ali, Prospects of Utilizing Investor-state Mediation and UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparencyfor Polycentric Environmental Disaster-RelatedDisputes: The Case of Vattenfall v.
Germany, in TRADE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH HARMONIZATION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 137 (Muruga

Perumal
8 1.
82.
83.
84.

Ramaswamy & Jodo Ribeiro eds., 2015).
Id.
Id.
Lon L. Fuller, Mediation: Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 329-30 (1971).
Vattenfall AB, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12.
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raises multi-dimensional issues of public policy and force majeure. 5 From both a
process as well as efficiency perspective, investor state mediation may prove a
viable alternative.
With respect to the second issue, the previous Section indicated that amicable
consultations are rather indeterminate in international investment law and many
investment treaties are unclear or silent with respect to their mandatory nature. 86In
this regard, investor-state mediation presents an alternative solution that can
provide the platform to effectively and expeditiously resolve a dispute prior to
filing an investor-state arbitration claim." In this sense, investor-state mediation
can also be more effective when compared to pre-arbitration consultations as well
as negotiation. To a certain extent, negotiation is an umbrella notion that covers
both the pre-arbitration phase, whereupon an investor-state mediation might take
place, and the arbitration phase, that could be initiated after an unfruitful investorstate mediation.8 8 These initial remarks aim to set the limitations of investor-state
mediation and also set its relation to other forms of alternative dispute resolution in
the international investment law arena. Regardless, the purpose of this article is to
show how the rise of transparency in investor-state arbitration could affect the
dynamics of investor-state mediation. In order to appraise this working hypothesis,
the next Part delineates the IBA Rules on Investor-State Mediation and emerging
models of investor-state mediation clauses in investment treaties. Before however
examining the emerging models of investor-state mediation, it is worth looking at
"quasi-mediation proceedings" that already exist under the auspices of the World
Bank, particularly under the ICSID Conciliation Proceedings.
C. ICSID ConciliationProceedings
Under the ICSID Convention, the "purpose of the Centre shall be to provide
facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between
Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention."89 Pursuant to this mandate the Centre in 1967
promulgated the ICSID Conciliation Rules 90 and subsequently in 1978 the ICSID

&

85. See Vattenfall AB, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12; NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER
MARTIN DIETRICH BRAUCH, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE STATE OF PLAY IN VATTENFALL
v. GERMANY
It: LEAVING THE GERMAN
PUBLIC
IN THE DARK 2 (Dec.
2014),
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/state-of-play-vattenfall-vs-germany-II-leavinggerman-public-dark-en.pdf.
86. See supraSection HA.
87. Jean E. Kalicki, Mediation of Investor-State Disputes: Revisiting the Prospects, KLUWER
ARB. BLOG (June 13, 2013), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2013/06/14/mediation-of-investor-statedisputes-revisiting-the-prospects/.
88. Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, InvestorState Dispute Resolution 31(1) FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 138, 155 (2007).
89. See ICSID CONVENTION, supranote 7, art. 1(2).
90. The original Conciliation Rules were adopted on Sept. 25, 1967 and were effective as of
Jan. 1, 1968. The Conciliation Rules have subsequently been amended three times. The first amendment
was approved and took immediate effect on Sept. 26, 1984. The second amendment was approved on
Sept. 29, 2002 and was effective on Jan. 1, 2003. The current Conciliation Rules were approved by
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Additional Facility Conciliation Rules.91 Nevertheless, as of December 31, 2016,
ICSID had registered 597 cases, 92 of which merely eight under the Conciliation
93
Rules and two under the Additional Facility Conciliation Rules.
While ICSID Conciliation proceedings encompass many of the core
characteristics paradigmatic to mediation, 94 they also create a rigid arbitration-like
procedural framework. In fact, it has been observed that the Conciliation Rules
provide for
a lengthy process, particularly in the beginning. It can take over four
months to constitute a conciliation commission under the ICSID Rules,
and then another sixty days to have a first session, facts that exacerbate
the perception of ICSID Conciliation as a protracted process that does
little to create momentum. It is natural, therefore, that parties seeking
resolution of their disputes would not opt for a process that is perceived
to simply prolong (or prevent) the production of a binding legal
document.

The limited publicly available information supports the accuracy of the above
statement. In fact, in two recent conciliation cases, the proceedings lasted for about
three years and appear to have taken the form of hard-fought trials.96 Based on the
written vote of the Administrative Council in 2006 and were effective from Apr. 10, 2006: (ICSID
Rules (2006). See https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/ICSID-Convention-ConciliationRules.aspx.
91. The original Additional Facility Conciliation Rules were adopted in 1978. The Additional
Facility Conciliation Rules have subsequently been amended twice. The first amendment was approved
on Sept. 29, 2002 and was effective on Jan. 1, 2003. The current rules were approved by written vote of

the Administrative Council in early 2006 and was effective from Apr. 10, 2006: ICSID Additional
See https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/ICSID-ConciliationFacility Rules (2006).
(Additional-Facility)-Rules.aspx.
92.

See

THE

ICSID

CASELOAD

-

STATISTICS

(ISSUE

2017-1),

ICSID,

https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%2OWeb%20Stats%2020171%20(English)%20Final.pdf.
93. See Xenofon Karagiannis v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. CONC/16/1; Republic of
Equatorial Guinea v. CMS Energy Corporation and others, ICSID Case No. CONC(AF)/12/2; Hess
Equatorial Guinea, Inc. and Tullow Equatorial Guinea Limited v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea, ICSID
Case No. CONC(AF)/12/1; RSM Production Corporation v. Republic of Cameroon, ICSID Case No.
CONC/ 1/1; Shareholders of SESAM v. Central African Republic, ICSID Case No. CONC/07/1; Togo
Electricit6 v. Republic of Togo, ICSID Case No. CONC/05/1; TG World Petroleum Limited v.
Republic of Niger, ICS[D Case No. CONC/03/1; SEDITEX Engineering Beratungsgesellschaft filr
dieTextilindustrie m.b.H. v. Madagascar, ICSID Case No. CONC/94/1; Tesoro Petroleum Corporation
v. Trinidad and Tobago, ICSID Case No. CONC/83/1; SEDITEX Engineering Beratungsgesellschaft
flir die Textilindustrie m.b.H. v. Democratic Republic of Madagascar, ICSID Case No. CONC/82/1;
94. See ICSID CONVENTION, supra note 7, arts. 28-35.
95. See Margrete Stevens & Ben Love, Investor-State Mediation: Observations on the Role of
Institutions 23, www.cedr.com/aboutus/arbitrationcommission/.

-

96. See Republic of Equatorial Guinea v. CMS Energy Corporation and others, ICSID Case No.
CONC(AF)/12/2 (Procedural Details: June 29, 2012, The Secretary-General registers a request for the
institution of conciliation proceedings; July 4, 2012, Following the appointment by the parties, Claus
von Wobeser (Mexican) accepts his appointment as Sole Conciliator; Mar. 15, 2013, The Sole
Conciliator holds a first session in New York; Sept. 16, 2013, Each party files a written statement of its
position pursuant to Article 33 of the ICSID Conciliation (Additional Facility) Rules; Oct. 18, 2013
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above, it would appear that ICSID conciliation proceedings cannot readily be
equated to investor-state mediation, as this has recently emerged, and is further
discussed in Part III of this article.

III. TIE EVOLUTION OF INVESTOR-STATE MEDIATION

A. The IBA 2012 Rules on Investor-StateMediation
1. Background
The IBA rules for Investor-State mediation ("The Rules") have as their
primary purpose the establishment of a set of concrete measures to be followed in
an investor-state mediation context to increase resort to mediation for investorstate disputes. 97 The State Mediation subcommittee of the Mediation committee,
housed under the IBA, promulgates The Rules.98 Formally adopted on October 4,
2012, The Rules are divided into 12 articles, and facilitate the resolution of
disputes between States and States entities. 99 The Rules establish clear guidelines
for the commencement of mediation and for the appointment of a mediator in
absence of party agreement.

Oct. 19, 2013, The Sole Conciliator visits the place connected with the dispute pursuant to Article 30
(4)(c) of the ICSID Conciliation (Additional Facility) Rules; Nov. 1, 2013, Each party files a second
written statement of its position pursuant to Article 33 of the ICSID Conciliation (Additional Facility)
Rules; Mar. 25, 2014 - Mar.27, 2014, The Sole Conciliator holds a hearing on conciliation in New
York; Jan. 12, 2015, The Sole Conciliator declares the proceeding closed in accordance with Article
37(2) of the Conciliation (Additional Facility) Rules; May 12, 2015, The Sole Conciliator renders its
Report); RSM Production Corporation v. Republic of Cameroon, ICSID Case No. CONC/ 1/1
(Procedural Details: Sept. 19, 2011, The Secretary-General registers a request for the institution of
conciliation proceedings; Dec. 6, 2011, Following appointment by the Claimant, J. Caleb Boggs III
(U.S.) accepts his appointment as conciliator; Dec. 23, 2011, Following appointment by the
Respondent, Jean-Pierre Ancel (French) accepts his appointment as conciliator; Feb. 17, 2012,
Following appointment by the Chairman, Marino Baldi (Swiss) accepts his appointment as Commission
President; Apr. 4, 2012, The Commission holds a first session in Paris; Apr. 30, 2012, The Respondent
files a request for the Commission to order the joinder of a third-party to the conciliation proceedings;
May 14, 2012, The Claimant files observations on the Respondent's request of April 30, 2012; June 15,
2012, The Commission decides on the Respondent's request of April 30, 2012; Aug. 9, 2012, The
Commission issues Procedural Order No. I regarding the participation of a third-party to the
proceedings; Aug. 17, 2012, The Commission issues Procedural Order No. 2 concerning the procedural
calendar; Sept. 7, 2012, The Claimant files a statement of facts; Sept. 28, 2012, The Respondent files a
statement of facts; Oct. 24, 2012 - Oct. 25, 2012, The Commission holds a hearing on the merits in
Paris; Dec. 19, 2012 - Dec. 20, 2012, The Commission holds a hearing on the merits in Paris; April 15,
2013, The Commission declares the proceeding closed in accordance with Article (34)(2) of the ICSID
Convention and ICSID Conciliation Rule 30(2); June 11, 2013, The Commission renders its Report).
97. International Bar Association Mediation Committee, State Mediation Subcommittee, IBA
Rules
for
Investor-State
Mediation,
art.
I
(Oct
2012),
available
at
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=8120ED1 I -F3C8-4A66-BE8 I77CB3FDB9E9F.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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2. Scope and Application
The Rules are designed for mediation of investment-related disputes
00
The Rules apply when the mediating parties
involving States and States entities.
0
have agreed on the rules or authorized a mediator to apply the rules.' o The Rules
02
may be varied or excluded partially or wholly at any time.1 Local provisions of
03
law take precedence over The Rules.'
3. News and Commentary
Wolters Kluwer N.V. commented that The Rules contain mostly standard
clauses seen in other mediation rules, but also contain innovative regulations such
as the clause on "Mediation Management Conference" (Article 9).1'0 It was also
relatively optimistic on the future application of The Rules and the entrance of
05
Herbert Smith Freehills
Mediation into the arena of Investor-State mediation.
commented on the relatively new development of including provisions for cointerest or
mediators, as well as the requirement of disclosure of any personal
06
personal conflict in a "statement of independence and availability."'
B. The emerging EU Model and Investor-State Mediation
A growing number of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements have
recently integrated provisions for investor-state mediation into their respective
0 7
frameworks as will be discussed below.
The EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA),
0
includes distinct investor-state mediation provisions.' In particular, the investorstate mediation clause reads as follows:
The disputing parties may at any time agree to have recourse to
mediation.

100. See id art.1.
101. See id art. 1(a).
102. International Bar Association Mediation Committee, State Mediation Subcommittee, IBA
at
available
2012),
2
(Oct
art.
Mediation,
Investor-State
for
Rules
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspxDocumentUid=8120ED11-F3C8-4A66-BE8177CB3FDB9E9F.
103. See id art. 3.
104. Id. art. 9; Kalicki, supranote 87.
105. See Munir Maniruzzaman, A Rethink of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, KLuWER ARB.
BLOG (May 30, 2013), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/05/30/a-rethink-of-investor-statedispute-settlement/.
106. See Herbert Smith Freehills, InternationalBar Association launches investor-state mediation
rules (Oct. 23, 2012), http://hsfnotes.com/adr/2012/10/23/intemational-bar-association-launchesinvestor-state-mediation-rules/.
107. See, e.g., Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, EU-Can., Annex 8-D, Oct. 30,
at
available
CETA],
[hereinafter
2016
EU-Vietnam Free Trade
http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf;
Agreement, EU-Viet, art 20, Feb. 1, 2016 [hereinafter EU-Viet. FTA]; Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade
Agreement, art 9.5, Feb. 4, 2016 [hereinafter TPP].
108. See CETA, supra note 107.
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Recourse to mediation is without prejudice to the legal position or rights
of either disputing party under this Chapter and is governed by the rules
agreed to by the disputing parties including, if available, the rules for
mediation adopted by the Committee on Services and Investment
pursuant to Article 8.44.3(c).
The mediator is appointed by agreement of the disputing parties. The
disputing parties may also request that the Secretary-General of ICSID
appoint the mediator.
The disputing parties shall endeavour to reach a resolution of the dispute
within 60 days from the appointment of the mediator.
If the disputing parties agree to have recourse to mediation, Articles
8.19.6 and 8.19.8 shall not apply from the date on which the disputing
parties agreed to have recourse to mediation to the date on which either
disputing party decides to terminate the mediation. A decision by a
disputing party to terminate the mediation shall be transmitted by way
of a letter to the mediator and the other disputing party. 0 9
Annex 29-C of CETA sets out Mediation Procedures for disputes between the
Contracting Parties, which could potentially also influence investor-state mediation
proceedings."1 0 These Articles describe the process of initiating the mediation
process, selecting the mediator, the mediation rules, implementation,
confidentiality, time limits, cost allocation, and puts in place a mechanism for
ongoing review of the Procedures."'
Similarly, the EU-Singapore FTA under its Annex 9-E and 9-F sets out a
Mediation Mechanism for Investor-State Disputes and a Code of Conduct For
Arbitrators and Mediators.1 2 These provisions are quite similar to those found in
CETA derive from a common objective of assisting parties to "facilitate the
finding of a mutually agreed solution through a comprehensive and expeditious
procedure.""1 3 The same model is expected to be followed in all future investment
chapters included in EU's FTAs, as is evidenced by the recent conclusion of the
EU-Vietnam FTA, that also includes an investor-state mediation clause.1 4
Further reflecting the trend toward the integration of mediation mechanisms
into investor-state dispute resolution, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade
Agreement (TPP)" 5 sets out a provision for mediation under its article 9.18 as
follows:
1. In the event of an investment dispute, the claimant and the respondent
should initially seek to resolve the dispute through consultation and

109. Id. art. 8.20.
110. Id. at Annex 29-C, art. 1-9.
1Il. Id at Annex 29-C, art 1-9.
112. EU-Sing. Free Trade Agreement, EU-Sing., June 29, 2015 [hereinafter EU-Sing. FTA],
Annex 9-E and 9-F.
113. Id.
114. EU-Viet. FTA, supra note 107, art. 5.
115. TPP,supranote 107, art. 9.18.
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negotiation, which may include the use of non-binding, third party
procedures, such as good offices, conciliation or mediation.
2. The claimant shall deliver to the respondent a written request for
consultations setting out a brief description of facts regarding the
measure or measures at issue.
3. For greater certainty, the initiation of consultations and negotiations
shall not be construed as recognition of the jurisdiction of the
tribunal.116

However, unlike the EU mediation model, the TPP provides little if at
all details on the procedure to be followed in investor-state mediation
cases.
D. The Convention on the Enforcement ofMediated Settlements
The Convention on the Enforcement of Mediated Settlements (CEMS)"',
proposed in July 2014 during a session of UNCITRAL, aims to establish
provisions on the enforceability of international commercial settlement agreements
reached through mediation/conciliation." Working Group II ("WGII"), one of six
working groups established by UNCITRAL to perform the substantive preparatory
work, received a mandate in July 2015 to explore the development of either (i) a
guidance text, (ii) model legislative provisions, or (iii) a convention on the
enforcement of mediated settlements.1 9 The aim of such a convention is to build
on the success of the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("NY Convention") in the development,
20
promotion and use of international mediation worldwide.1 Observers have noted
that if the Convention is adopted with the same enthusiasm as the NY Convention:
[I]t will (i) create a strong international legal framework for mediation,
that will (ii) encourage more parties to use this mechanism and (iii)
result in many more disputes being settled without the time and
expenses of litigation and arbitration, leading to (iv) greater and more
effective access to justice.121
These developments and especially the possibility of the conclusion of the
CEMS, will on the one hand enhance the international enforceability of mediated
settlements but on the other hand may raise serious concerns with respect
transparency. For if CEMS were to be concluded, could it mean that investor-state
mediation would now be convenient method to avoid the high levels of
transparency now paradigmatic to investor-state arbitration? To respond to this
issue, it is first necessary to turn to the current state of transparency in investor-

116. Id., art. 9.18.
117. See generally Shentenawi, supranote 25.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New

York, June 10, 1958.
121. Shentenawi, supra note 25.
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state arbitration.
IV. THE RISE

OF TRANSPARENCY IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION

Transparency in investor-state arbitration has recently entered a completely
new phase,1 22 with the adoption of the 2014 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparencyl 2 3
and the conclusion of the United Nations Convention on Transparency in TreatyBased Investor-State Arbitration (known as Mauritius Convention). 124 The basic
characteristics of these instruments are further discussed below. Suffice it to say,
however, the surge in transparency requirements in investor-state arbitration was
caused by generally the same reasons driving the so-called backlash against this
method of international dispute settlement. These reasons were briefly discussed in
the introduction to this article, and among others revolve around public interest
concerns and the nature and sectors where investor-state arbitration cases arise.
The purpose of this Section is to delineate the main tenets of the UNCITRAL
Rules on Transparencyl25 and the Mauritius Convention 26 and thus pave the way
for the next Section that will appraise these developments in light of investor-state
mediation and the proposed Convention on the Enforcement of Mediated
Settlements.

122.

See generally Stephan W. Schill, Editorial: The Mauritius Convention on Transparency, 16 J.

WORLD INv. & TRADE 201, 201-04 (2015) [hereinafter Schill, Editorial];Stephan W. Schill, Editorial:
Five Times Transparency in InternationalInvestment Law, 15 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 363, 369-72
(2014); Lise Johnson, The Transparency Rules and Transparency Convention: A good start and model
for broader reform in investor-statearbitration,COLUM. FDI PERSPECTIVES, July 21, 2014, available

at ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-126-Johnson-FINALI.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2015); Samuel
Levander, Resolving "Dynamic Interpretation":An Empirical Analysis of the UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparency,52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 506, 54041 (2014); Luke Eric Peterson, As Transparency
Rules Take Effect, And UN Launches Case Registry, How Much Of ISDS Universe Will Be Laid Open
Through This
New
Portal?, INVEST.
ARB.
REP.,
Apr.
1, 2014, available at
www.iareporter.com/articles/as-transparency-rules-take-effect-and-un-launches-case-registry-howmuch-of-isds-universe-will-be-laid-open-through-this-new-portal/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
123. See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration (2014), as adopted by Resolution of the General Assembly 68/109, U.N. Doc. A/68/462
(Dec.
16,
2013),
available
at
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-ontransparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf [hereinafter Transparency Rules].
124. See UNCITRAL, U.N. Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration, G.A. Res. 69/116, U.N. Doc. A/69/496 (Dec. 10, 2014), available at
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Fransparency-Convention-e.pdf
[hereinafter Mauritius Convention]; see also UNCITRAL, U.N. Commission on International Trade
Law Approves Draft UNCITRAL Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State
Arbitration,
U.N.
Press
Release
UNIS/1J202
(July
10,
2014),
available at
www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2014/unisl2O2.html.
125. Transparency Rules, supranote 123.
126. Mauritius Convention, supra note 124.
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The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency

A.
1.

Background

The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based investor-State
Arbitration (the "Rules on Transparency"), which came into effect on April 1,
2014, "comprise a set of procedural rules that provide for transparency and
27
accessibility to the public of treaty-based investor-State arbitration."1 The aim is
to facilitate public disclosure of arbitration awards. This follows transparency
trends within other areas of international arbitration (such as ICSID) and can give
28
rise to greater consistency in awards.1
2.

Scope

The Rules on Transparency in general apply to investor-state arbitration under
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, but only for investment treaties concluded on
or after April 1, 2014.129 For investment treaties prior to that date, as well as for
treaties that fall within the above temporal scope, the Rules can apply by
30
agreement of the disputing parties.'
3.

Content

In terms of substance and content, the Rules on Transparency deal with four
main aspects of transparency considerations in investor-state arbitration.' 3 ' In brief,
these are the publication of documents arising from such proceedings, the openness
of investor-state arbitration hearings, the participation of the Contracting Parties to
32
an investment treaty and the participation of amicus curiae.1

127. See
UNCITRAL,

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration,
(last
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitraltexts/arbitration/2014Transparency.html

visited Nov. 19, 2016).

&

128. See Christina Knahr, The New Rules on Participationof Non-Disputing Parties in ICSID
Arbitration - Blessing or Curse?, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 319
(Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011); Christina Knahr & August Reinisch, Transparency versus
Confidentiality in International Investment Arbitration - The Biwater Gauff Compromise, 6 LAW
PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 97, 97-118 (2007); LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION

141 (2d ed. 2011); Margie-Lys Jaime, Relying Upon Parties'InterpretationIn Treaty-Based InvestorState Dispute Settlement: Filling The Gaps In International Investment Agreements, 46 GEO. 1. INT'L L.

261, 287 (2014). See also ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 48(5); ICSID Convention Arbitration
Rules, rules 37(2) and 48(4) (2006); see also ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, art. 53(3)
(2006).
129. See Transparency Rules, supra note 115, art. 1(1); see also id. art. 1(2); Luke E. Peterson, UN
Working Group Finalizes UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, But They Won't Apply Automatically To
Stockpiles Of Existing Investment Treaties, INVEST. ARB. REP., Feb. 14, 2013, available at
www.iareporter.com/articles/un-working-group-finalizes-uncitral-transparency-rules-but-they-wont-

apply-automatically-to-stockpiles-of-existing-investment-treaties/

(last visited Aug. 27, 2015); Julia

Salasky & Corinne Montineri, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State

Arbitration, 31 ASA BULLETIN 774, 774-76 (2013).
130. See Transparency Rules, supra note 123, art. 1(2), art. 1(9).
131. Id.art.3(1).
132.

Id.
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With respect to the publication of documents arising from investor-state
arbitration, the Rules on Transparency list a series of documents that are subject to
public disclosure, including expert reports and witness statements.1 33 The exhibits
themselves are generally excluded from public disclosure but a table listing all
exhibits should nevertheless be disclosed.1 34 Specific provisions also provide for
the protection of confidential information, that are subject to redaction prior to the
disclosure of documents arising from investor-state arbitration.1 35 The wide scope
of transparency is also linked to oral hearings that are generally open to the public
and through any means, including live transmission on the web.' 3 6 Certainly, parts
of the hearings can be conducted in camera when "there is a need to protect
confidential information or the integrity of the arbitral process."'
The
participation of Contracting Parties and amicus curiae deals with the participation
of non-disputing parties lato sensu.'3 8 Contracting Parties to an investment treaty
usually the investor's home state- can make submissions with regard to "issues of
treaty interpretation"' 39 and following the consultation of the disputing parties, an
arbitral tribunal can also allow submissions "on further matters within the scope of

133. Id. art. 3(2).
134. Id. art. 3(1). Compare U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 29(1) (2004) [hereinafter
U.S. Model BIT 2004], with U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 29(1) (2012) [hereinafter U.S.
Model BIT 2012].
135. Transparency Rules, supra note 115, art. 7(2H7), 7(3)-(4) state:
3. The arbitral tribunal, after consultation with the disputing parties, shall make arrangements
to prevent any confidential or protected information from being made available to the public,
including by putting in place, as appropriate: (a) Time limits in which a disputing party, non-

disputing Party to the treaty or third person shall give notice that it seeks protection for such
information in documents; (b) Procedures for the prompt designation and redaction of the
particular confidential or protected information in such documents; and (c) Procedures for
holding hearings in private to the extent required by article 6, paragraph 2. Any
determination as to whether information is confidential or protected shall be made by the
arbitral tribunal after consultation with the disputing parties. 4. Where the arbitral tribunal
determines that information should not be redacted from a document, or that a document
should not be prevented from being made available to the public, any disputing party, nondisputing Party to the treaty or third person that voluntarily introduced the document into the
record shall be permitted to withdraw all or part of the document from the record of the
arbitral proceedings.

See also Federico Ortino, Transparency of Investment Awards: External and Internal Dimensions, in
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 119, 132-34
(Junji

Nakagawa

ed.,

2013);

JOACHIM

DELANEY

&

DANIEL

B.

MAGRAW,

PROCEDURAL

TRANSPARENCY 751-76 (2008); Calamita, supra note 22, at 649-50; Bamali Choudhury, Recapturing
Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration's Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the
Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 775,786-87 (2008).
136. Transparency Rules, supra note 123, art. 6(3) ("tribunal shall make logistical arrangements to
facilitate the public access to hearings ("including where appropriate by organizing attendance through
video links or such other means as it deems appropriate.")
137. Transparency Rules, supranote 123, art. 6(2).
138. See Jaime, supra note 128, at 287. Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and
Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 45 (2013).
139. Transparency Rules, supranote 123, art. 5(1).
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the dispute." 4 0 On the other hand, amicus curiae submissions or briefs refer to
submissions of non-state actors, such as NGOs.141 Such third parties are allowed to
42
ensuring that the subject matter of
file submissions under a certain procedure
such submission is within the scope of the dispute, that such submission "would
43
assist the arbitral tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue",' does
not "disrupt or unduly burden the arbitral proceedings, or unfairly prejudice any
disputing party'" and that the disputants "are given a reasonable opportunity to
45
Amici are
present their observations on any submission by the third person."
nevertheless not allowed to participate in the arbitration hearing and present oral
evidence.
140. Transparency Rules, supra note 123, art. 5(2).
141. See Lucas Bastin, Amici Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration: Eight Recent Trends, 30 ARB.

INT'L 125, 127-40 (2014); Lucas Bastin, The Amicus Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration, I

&

CAMBRIDGE J. INT'L & COMP. L. 208, 214-21 (2012); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Transparency
and Amicus Curiae Briefs, 1 J. WORLD INT'L & TRADE 333 (2004); Alexis Mourre, Are Amici Curiae
the Proper Response to the Public 's Concerns on Transparency in Investment Arbitration?, 5 LAW
PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 257, 257-71 (2006); Andrea Bjorklund, The Participationof SubNational Government Units as Amici Curiae in InternationalInvestment Disputes, in EVOLUTION IN
INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 298, 298-316 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011);
Jorge Vifluales, Amicus Intervention in Investor-State Arbitration, 61(4) DISP. RES. J. 72 (2007); J.
Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration Through

Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation,52 MCGILL L. J. 681, 697-705 (2007); Julie Lee,
UNCITRAL's Unclear Transparency Instrument: Fashioning the Form and Application of a Legal
Standard Ensuring GreaterDisclosure in Investor-State Arbitrations, 33 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 439,

493-56 (2013); Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1269, 1286-90 (2009); Eparninontas E. Triantafilou, Amicus Submissions in Investor-State
Arbitration After Suez v. Argentina: The Gillis Wetter Prize, 24 ARB. INT'L 571 (2008); Tomoko
Ishikawa, Third Party ParticipationIn Investment Treaty Arbitration, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 373,
373-412 (2010); Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The

Implications ofan Increase in Third-PartyParticipation,29 BERK. J. INT'L L. 200, 200-24 (2011).
142.

Transparency Rules, supra note 115, art. 4(1)H2) states:
After consultation with the disputing parties, the arbitral tribunal may allow a person that is
not a disputing party, and not a non-disputing Party to the treaty ('third person(s)'), to file a
written submission with the arbitral tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the
dispute. A third person wishing to make a submission shall apply to the arbitral tribunal, and
shall, in a concise written statement, which is in a language of the arbitration and complies

with any page limits set by the arbitral tribunal: (a) Describe the third person, including,
where relevant, its membership and legal status (e.g., tmde association or other nongovernmental organization), its general objectives, the nature of its activities and any parent
organization (including any organization that directly or indirectly controls the third person);
(b) Disclose any connection, direct or indirect, which the third person has with any disputing
party; (c) Provide information on any government, person or organization that has provided
to the third person (i) any financial or other assistance in preparing the submission; or (ii)
substantial assistance in either of the two years preceding the application by the third person

under this article (e.g. funding around 20 per cent of its overall operations annually); (d)
Describe the nature of the interest that the third person has in the arbitration; and (e) Identify

the specific issues of fact or law in the arbitration that the third person wishes to address in
its written submission.

143. Id. art. 4(3)(b).
144. Id. art. 4(5).
145. Id. art. 4(6).
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The above delineation of the Rules on Transparency elucidates the drastic
change that these rules endeavor to make in the field of international investment
law. The limitation of their temporal scope to investment treaties concluded on or
after April 1, 2014, has recently been addressed by the Mauritius Convention
discussed below."'4
B. The Mauritius Convention
1. Background
The United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based InvestorState Arbitration was approved by the UN General Assembly in the Fall of
2014,147 and was opened for signature in Port Louis on March 17, 2015 (hence the
name "Mauritius Convention"). 1 48
2. Scope
Unlike the Rules on Transparency, the Mauritius Convention applies to
investment treaties concluded before April 1, 2014149 and to investor-state
arbitrations initiated under such treaties after the Mauritius Convention enters into
force.150 For the Convention to enter into force, three ratifications are required, but
as of today, Mauritius is the only country that has ratified the Convention.'s5
Furthermore, subject to a reservation stating otherwise, when the host state
(respondent state) but not the investor's home state has ratified the Convention, the
Transparency Rules will apply to an investment treaty concluded before April 1,
2014, at the election of the disputing investor (unilateral offer of application).1 5 2
3. Content
The Mauritius Convention does not include substantive provisions in its body
but merely incorporates by reference the Rules on Transparency discussed above.
The Convention nevertheless adopts a slightly different approach with respect to
its application. Unlike the Rules on Transparency that generally apply to investorstate arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, unless the disputing
parties otherwise agree, the Convention applies to any investor-state arbitration.1 53
Certainly, this broader application is to a certain degree limited by a set of
reservations that are available to the contracting parties that eventually choose to
146. Mauritius Convention, supra note 124.
147. See U.N. Convention on Transparency, supra note 124.
148. Mauritius Convention, supra note 124; States Sign Convention on Transparency, 10(2)
GLOBAL ARB. REv. 7, 7 (2015); Lise Johnson, The Mauritius Convention on Transparency: Comments
on the treaty and its role in increasing transparencyof investor-State arbitration,CCSI Policy Paper,

Sept. 2014, available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/12/10.-Johnson-Mauritius-Convention-onTransparency-Convention.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2016).
149.

Mauritius Convention, supra note 124, art. 1(1).

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 9.
Id. art. 2(2).
Id. art. 2(1).
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ratify the Convention. Whether they will also make reservations and thus limit the
application of the Mauritius Convention to certain investment treaties or investorstate arbitration under certain arbitration rules, remains to be seen in the near
future. 154
V. ARE TRANSPARENCY AND MEDIATION ANTITHETIC IN NATURE?
A. Investor-State Mediation as a threat to Transparency?
For cases that continue to raise sensitive issues of a confidential nature,
parties may consider the confidentiality requirements associated with investor state
mediation. Confidentiality has been considered as an essential element in
mediation. It has been conceived that confidentiality encourages parties to speak
155
freely and openly in the mediation while ensuring the integrity of the process.
However, there is always a tension between confidentiality of mediation process
and the administration of justice. When parties wish to litigate on issues related to
topics addressed during mediation, in most cases the courts are not permitted to
156
Only in
rely on mediated discussions unless special circumstances exist.
circumstances where pre-existing information which is admissible in trial is also
disclosed in mediation, or information is shared that is generally available to the
public, or the parties allege breach of duty or professional misconduct of the
157
mediator, can the limits of confidentiality in mediation be said to be reached.
Notwithstanding the general approach to confidentiality within the mediation
process, there have been several examples of non-confidential public sector
resource mediation, which demonstrate the possibilities for transparency in select
investor-state mediation cases. For example, take the mediation involving the
Snake River Basin in the United States involving $200 million USD in damages
and raising over 150,000 water rights claims employed a public mediation
process.158 The case involved legal issues pertaining to treaty and statutory
interpretation of federal and constitutional statutes.159 Parties included an Idaho
Power Company and a plethora of interested federal entities including the
Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of
Energy, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Council of Environmental Quality, and
the Fish and Wildlife Services to name a few.i1o The issues varied from "fishing in

154. The available reservations are of three kinds: (a) the Rules on Transparency will not apply
with respect to a specific investment treaty. Mauritius Convention, supra note 116, art. 3(1)(a); the
Rules on Transparency will only apply with respect to arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Rules.
Mauritius Convention, supra note 116, art. 3(1)(b); the unilateral offer will not apply in cases in which
a state is the respondent. Mauritius Convention, supra note 124, art. 3(l)(c).
155.

ALEXANDER NADJA, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE MEDIATION: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES

245 (2009).
156. Id. at 247.
157. Id. at 282-285.
158. Francis McGovern, Mediation of the Snake River Basin, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 547, 548-53
(2006).
159. Id. at 553.
160. Id. at 553-54.
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general" of particular species like Salmon, to fishing passage, fish rearing and
water flow along with channel maintenance, industrial and municipal pollution,
and recreational uses of the river.' 6 ' The conflict was also riddled with legal issues
pertaining the interpretation of Treaties of 1855162, 1863163 and 1 89 3 ,M and U.S.
federal statutes such as The Endangered Species Act (ESA) '6 5 and the Clean Water
Act' The main issues largely involved how statutes for the maintenance of the
quality of the river could be enforced if the resources were shared and clarifying
the fragile relationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes in
terms of resource management responsibilities. 167
In terms of the mediation process employed in this public sector dispute, a
problem-solving and forward looking approach was taken.' 6 8 The ultimate success
of the mediation was attributed to the focus on "future" and a realistic and
"doable" settlement possibilities. 169 The process lasted for six years reaching
settlements on "water flows, endangered species, resource allocation and
management, and governmental cooperation."' 70 The parties arrived at a settlement
of federal funding in the amount of $200 million USD and an agreement of
cooperative management for maintenance of water quality and flows of creeks and
streams. This creative, multi-pronged settlement was made possible through the
help of a small team of lawyers, stakeholders, and the use of a problem-solving
model, all of which was feasible in the context of mediation, but very likely a
17
result that could not have been achieved through an adjudication process.n
Similarly, the mediation involving the management of the endangered
Allagash river resources employed a public mediation process. 172 The parties - a
group of 23 stakeholders and advisors, including environmentalists, native
sportsmen, Maine residents, and state canoeists - had been embroiled in a long
term conflict with "no prospect of 'victory. -"73 These parties agreed to meet over
a 30 hour mediated deliberation in the backdrop of a retreat at the River Divers
Restaurant in Millinocket, Maine.' 74 The mediator spent considerable time with the
stakeholders individually so as to understand their concerns and ascertain

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 555.
Id. at 548.
Francis McGovern, Mediation of the Snake River Basin, 42 IDAHO L. REv. 547, 548 (2006).
Id.
Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1982), available at

https://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/esact.html.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
McGovern, supra note 150, at 555.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 562.
Id

172. Jonathan W. Reitman, The Allagash: A Case Study ofa Successful EnvironmentalMediation,
MEDIATECOM (2003), http://www.mediate.com/articles/reitmanJ.cfm.

173. Id.
174. Id.
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priorities.' 7 5 At issue was the "original intent"17 6 of the documents entailing the
creation of the waterway as well as a set of related or "tiered" issues. 7 7 Mediation
proved effective in arriving at a "one-text"1 7 8 agreement addressing a diverse set of
interests formulated and signed by all concerned parties. 79
The above examples demonstrate that in some cases, transparent public-sector
mediation can prove effective in resolving complex multi-party disputes at the
domestic level. This experience is useful in considering the potential applicability
of transparent multi-party investor state mediation in a select category of cases.
B. Investor-State Mediation as a supplementary, gap-filling mechanism
Many scholars have begun to consider the potential of investor-state
mediation as a supplementary gap-filling mechanism in the world of investor-state
disputes. 8 0 This is due not only to the rigidity and financial cost associated with
investor-state arbitration as described above, but also due to the often symbiotic
relationship between host and investor, potential "policy costs", relational damage
and possibility for non-compliance.
In terms of relational considerations, the host state in many cases is often
"dependent upon the continued provision by the investor of the needed public
service" while the investor "having submitted substantial capital to the privatized
enterprise, is dependent on the host country for continued revenues." 82 Cases
involving long-term relational commitments are often seen as most conducive to
mediated settlements.
Such relational considerations come in to play when considering the question
of enforcement. When agreements are imposed and not arrived at through mutual
consent, investors often run the risk of a nation choosing not to comply with an
adverse award or repeal a given underlying treaty if the award amount is
considered burdensome.
In addition to relational considerations and the financial costs of the
arbitration process, the "policy cost" of investor state arbitration requiring a "host
country to repeal or modify measures that were implemented for the public
good"'83 are leading potential parties to look beyond arbitration for resolution.
The case of Metalclad v. Mexicol84 is illustrative. The Chief Executive

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Jonathan W. Reitman, The Allagash: A Case Study of a Successful Environmental Mediation,
MEDIATECOM (2003), http://www.mediate.com/articles/reitmanJ.cfm.
178. Id.
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184. Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSIID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (May
19, 1997).
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Officer of Metalclad, Grant Kesler, noted that after winning a $17 million USD
arbitral award against Mexico, in hindsight and despite "winning" the case, felt
that "the arbitration had been so dissatisfying that [he] wished the company had
relied on other options to resolve the dispute."'8 5 Such cases illustrate the
increasing openness on the part of parties to look beyond arbitration for resolution
processes that build upon consensual solutions that respect legitimate policy
considerations and preserve on-going relationships.
VI. CONCLUSION

Reconciling the freedom of expression facilitated through confidential
mediation communications and the public interest in transparency is a delicate
balance to strike. Cases do exist of effective transparent public sector mediated
outcomes at the domestic level with high rates of compliance as described in this
paper. Yet, cases also exist requiring a high degree of discretion because they
involve trade secrets, sensitive government protocols, and policy concerns that
may not be effectively mediated in the glare of the public eye. In light of the above
factors, it is suggested that in the early stages of the development of investor-state
mediation, confidentiality be preserved. As the process becomes more fully
established, familiarity is gained, expertise is developed, and selected mediated
cases become public through party consent, the question of transparency in
investor-state mediation can also be re-examined with an eye toward gradual
openness in the long term.

185. Gracious, supra note 180.

